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We study the introduction of new technology into (organizational) practices. We argue 
against the dualist under-pinning of typical IS technology appropriation literature and 
develop a phenomenological theory of appropriation based on Martin Heidegger’s 
analysis of equipment. On this view, technology moves from being an object inspected in 
the practice foreground to becoming equipment as a transparent means located in the 
practice background. We show that this transformation occurs through a practice of 
actively performed place-making in which the technology is accommodated in the 
practice among existing equipment, practical logics and social identities. We illustrate 
our theory with a rich case study of social media appropriation, making methodological 
use of the novel feature that self-referential conversations are captured within the 
technology, providing access to direct evidence of the appropriation phenomenon. The 
paper contributes a more nuanced sociomaterial account of the simultaneous 
transformation of technology and practices occurring in technology introduction. 
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Introduction 
The topic of our paper is the introduction of new technologies into (organizational) practices. While 
textbooks in Information Systems typically present information technology introduction as discrete steps 
in a process involving various decisions, a body of literature has emerged characterizing the phenomenon 
as a time-extended appropriation process, described as "the way that users evaluate and adopt, adapt 
and integrate a technology into their everyday practices" (Mendoza et al. 2010, 5). Initiated by the work 
of DeSanctis and Poole (1994) a core aim of this emerging stream of research has been to explain the 
variation in (unintended) outcomes when users take new technology into practice. However, the literature 
has struggled to grasp how exactly both the technology and the practice change in this process. We argue 
that appropriation research has been limited by certain commitments at the ontology level to a widely 
held dualist worldview, which leads to attributing change to either the technology entity or the user entity. 
Moreover, as the focus has been on explaining the variation in outcomes, with some notable exceptions 
(e.g. Carroll et al. 2002) there has been little research on what exactly happens during appropriation, that 
is, on what users do. We make this appropriation phenomenon the object of our study and propose a new 
theory of technology appropriation. 
In order to overcome the limitations of existing dualist approaches and to uncover the structure of the 
appropriation phenomenon, we propose to reframe the problem at the ontology level. We draw on 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, outlined in Being and Time (1927; 
1962). His work will allow us to distinguish IT as an object of inspection and reflection from IT as it is in 
use, which is captured by Heidegger’s concept of equipment (Riemer and Johnston 2011). Using this 
equipment concept we propose to interpret technology appropriation as the change of IT from an object 
evaluated by users upon first encounter, to equipment when it is transparently implicated in a practice. 
We present a theory that explains this transformation as place-making, which involves changes in the 
structure of the practice, accommodation of new equipment among existing equipment, and changes to 
social identity production, as well as how meaning is produced within the practice.  
We draw on a case study in social media to illustrate our theory. Our case outlines the appropriation of the 
enterprise microblogging service Yammer into the consulting practice at a large multi-national company. 
With access to first-hand data stored within the Yammer platform we are able to undertake a true 
phenomenological study of the unfolding technology appropriation by analyzing actual user conversations 
about the technology and its emerging use as it happened at the time. Access to such user conversations, 
in which users discuss and make sense of the new technology as they take it into their practice, allows us 
to study appropriation in a novel way without having to rely on post-hoc accounts provided by users in 
interviews. This methodological approach allows us to illustrate the plausibility and applicability of our 
theory by uncovering the structures by which the new technology is accommodated into the existing 
practice. True to our ontological position this will lead us to interpret place-making itself as a practice, a 
practice for changing practices. 
Our study offers important insights into the nature and structure of the appropriation phenomenon; it 
provides a rich explanation of what happens when new technologies are taken into organizational 
practice. We contribute to the IS literature a phenomenological theory of technology appropriation. This 
differs from existing theory by focusing on how the technology changes ontologically when being enrolled 
into a practice and how the practice changes as the technology is being accommodated, rather than on the 
factors that explain and predict appropriation outcomes. As such, it provides an example of a genuine 
non-dualist analysis in line with recent calls to study the sociomateriality of IT (Orlikowski and Scott 
2008). Our theory can be classified as a theory for explaining (cf. Gregor 2006), as it provides a detailed 
account of how technology is appropriated into an existing practice. Understanding appropriation as a 
place-making practice has important practical implications, as such a practice may be cultivated by 
businesses to improve their appropriation capability. 
In the first part of the paper we develop our theory. We begin by briefly outlining the shortcomings in IS 
appropriation studies. We will then present Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of equipment and 
formulate our theory. In the second part of our paper we illustrate our theory with a case study. We begin 
by introducing the case setting and spelling out our methodology. After presenting our findings on how 
appropriation played out in the case, we discuss these findings in light of our theory and characterize 
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place-making as a second order practice (Reimers et al. 2010b). We conclude by outlining practical 
implications and contributions to IS literature.  
Literature Analysis 
In this section we first outline existing conceptions of technology appropriation in the Information 
Systems literature. We then demonstrate that this body of literature is founded upon a dualist 
understanding of the relation between technology and users that is grounded in what is commonly known 
as the Cartesian worldview. We spell out the limitations of dualist approaches to explaining the changes 
that take place during technology appropriation and propose to rethink appropriation on a non-dualist 
foundation that we find in Heidegger’s work. 
Technology Appropriation in the IS Literature 
Textbooks in Information Systems typically follow a fit logic (Goodhue and Thompson 1995) to describe 
the organizational introduction of technology and characterize it as a rational process with discrete steps 
(e.g. Stair et al. 2011; Turban and Volonino 2011). Typically these steps are: 1) an organization makes the 
decision to acquire or develop a new technology based on a rational matching of task requirements with 
technology features, 2) it then implements the new technology through roll-out to the user group 
(including testing, installation, training etc.), and 3) users finally decide to accept or reject the technology 
based on their own local assessments. The latter is the subject of typical user acceptance theories in IS 
(e.g. Davis and Bagozzi 1989; Venkatesh et al. 2003). 
However, beginning with the much-cited work of DeSanctis and Poole (1994) there has been explicit 
recognition in the IS literature that technology introduction is a much less discrete and determinate 
process than this. These authors introduced the notion of technology appropriation to denote that users 
make technology their own in a time-extended process of adaptation, whereby both the technology and 
individual and collective practices are changed. They saw this process as both a threat to the rational 
objectives of management captured in the notion of ‘unfaithful use’, as well as explaining the variance in 
outcomes. Consequently, literature in this tradition is typically concerned with theorizing appropriation 
outcomes while softening the determinism of earlier task-technology fit models (e.g. Dennis et al. 2001). 
Concurrently, there has been a struggle in the IS literature to capture and explain the mutual changes to 
technologies and user practices that occur when new technology is appropriated. At the time, DeSanctis 
and Poole conceived of technology as inscribing social structures in its features, which are subsequently 
changed through use, non-use, or changed use. On the other hand adaptation of user practices was seen to 
occur “when the technology structures become shared, enduring sets of cognitive scripts” (DeSanctis and 
Poole 1994, 128). Accommodation between these two changing entities is then achieved through a process 
of structuration (Giddens 1984) in which a fit or alignment (Majchrzak et al. 2000) is achieved between 
social structures inscribed in the features of the technology and social structures reproduced in 
organizational action. However, this approach has been criticized, for example for inscribing uses into 
technology features (e.g. see Jones et al. 2004). Others have responded to these criticisms by locating 
technology structure somewhere between the technology and the user, for instance as relational 
affordances (Markus and Silver 2008) or in use practices (Orlikowski 2000).  
The Cartesian Framing of Existing Appropriation Literature 
Evident in the above approaches is an inherent dualism between technology on the one hand and users on 
the other hand, commonly referred to as the Cartesian worldview (Orlikowski and Scott 2008). The 
Cartesian worldview comprises a set of beliefs that have entered everyday and scientific ontological 
understanding and underpins, at least implicitly, mainstream research in the Information Systems 
discipline (Riemer and Johnston 2011). While French philosopher Rene Descartes’ seminal work (1644, 
2010) was influential in founding the Cartesian tradition, a range of other influences (e.g. Hume 1740, 
2009) have contributed to its proliferation (for a review see Scada 2004). The Cartesian worldview rests 
on a dualism that places human subjects vis-à-vis an ‘external’ world that is populated by objects. On this 
view, humans take in this external world via their bodily senses and hold in their mind an internal 
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representation of the (objects in the) world. Hence, the Cartesian worldview posits a mind “in here” 
reflecting on, and directing the body to act upon, a world “out there”. It is the mind that turns the external 
world of initially meaningless substances into the meaningful world that we experience. Consequently, the 
underlying ontological foundation of this world-view is that the world consists of independently existent 
things with properties (Bunge 1977; Weber 1997); even humans are conceived in that way, as minds with 
mental attributes such and goals, beliefs and attitudes (Weber 2012, 2). 
Existing approaches in the technology appropriation literature draw on this dualist, cognitivist worldview. 
It is common in this literature to conceive of technology as bundles of functional or symbolic features. 
Hence, despite rhetorical devices suggesting that technologies change ontologically as a result of 
appropriation, e.g. from technology-as-designed to technology-in-practice (Orlikowski 2000) or 
technology-in-use (Carroll et al. 2002), technology change is severely circumscribed by conceiving it in 
terms of reconfiguration of the inherent (designed) features. On the other hand, practices are typically 
described in terms of user beliefs and attitudes or management goals and thus in essentially cognitive 
terms. Changes to practices then become changes to internal user representations of feature-use, such as 
cognitive scripts (DeSanctis and Poole 1994) or behavioral templates (Orlikowski, 2000 quoting Barley 
1988), which are juxtaposed between technologies as features and users as minds. Under this 
appropriation logic, change is caused by the ‘appropriation moves’ of users, while technology merely 
presents ‘structural potential’ or ‘affordances’ upon which users can draw (DeSanctis and Poole 1994). 
Similarly, others have characterized appropriation as resulting from user activities of exploring and 
tailoring systems features (Stevens 2009, Draxler et al. 2011).  
Challenging the Dualist Ontology underpinning Appropriation 
We argue that the dualist understanding of technology appropriation is limiting in that any changes 
occurring have to be attributed to changes in either the technology object (via changes to its properties or 
features) or in the user subject (via changes to internal representations, such as cognitive scripts). It is 
important to emphasize that while appropriation studies aim to explain changes to organizational 
practices, an authentic articulation of the notion of “practice” requires a break from dualist thinking (e.g. 
Reimers et al. 2010a; Schatzki 2002) to capture the ontological co-constitution of the material and social 
aspects of practice. Moreover, we argue that such dualist accounts fail to capture: 1) changes to the 
technology as experienced by users (what technology becomes in practice, its meaning in the user world); 
2) technological agency, as appropriation is typically attributed to the users as the causal agents of 
change; and 3) how appropriation of new technologies makes the world intelligible to users in new ways.  
To address these problems we propose in this paper a theory of appropriation built over the non-dualist 
ontology articulated by Heidegger in Being and Time (1927; 1962). Heidegger’s analysis of equipment 
proves useful for this enterprise because: 1) it offers a holistic ontology that already implicitly underpins 
contemporary non-dualist accounts of practices (Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki 2002) and the emerging 
sociomateriality literature in IS (Orlikowski and Scott 2008), 2) it offers a detailed account of human 
everyday engagement with material entities, 3) it decenters humans as the locus of agency (so called post-
humanism (Pickering 1995)), 4) through its notion of ‘ways of being’ it allows for an ontological change of 
material entities in use, and 5) it encompasses the role of equipment in giving meaning to entities and 
events in the world.  
Although Heidegger’s work has been used in IS previously, his equipment analysis has not yet been 
exploited as an analytical framework for explaining technology appropriation. Some studies have 
mentioned Heidegger’s notion of equipment loosely (Dourish 2001; Introna 1997; Turner 2005; 
Winograd 1995; Winograd and Flores 1987) and others have appropriated related concepts from Being 
and Time, such as his notion of being-in-the-world to outline situated action (Dourish 2001), humanness 
(Porra 1999), management in practice (Introna 1997), and mood (Ciborra and Willcocks 2006). 
Heidegger’s Phenomenological Analysis of Equipment 
In outlining Heidegger’s analysis of equipment we draw on Heidegger’s original work (1927; 1962) and the 
work by Berkeley Heidegger scholar Hubert L. Dreyfus, in particular his 1991 commentary and his 2007 
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lectures (Dreyfus 1991; Dreyfus 2007), as well as selected further secondary sources (Blattner 2006; 
Dreyfus and Wrathall 2008; Harman 2010; Taylor 2006). 
Ways of Being 
The traditional topic of ontology has been to elaborate and categorize the kinds of entities there are in the 
world (e.g. Bunge 1977; Weber 1997; Weber 2012). Heidegger’s innovation in Being and Time is to ask an 
entirely new question: what are the kinds of ways that entities can be in the world?  
Heidegger argues that this question can only be answered by first examining the peculiar way of being of 
that entity for which being is an issue. This being Heidegger calls Dasein. For Heidegger the way of being 
of humans (Dasein) is engagement in practices. The unique mode of human existence is to be such-and-
such by doing such-and-such. For instance, a doctor not only practices medicine but is a doctor because 
s/he practices medicine. It is important to note that Dasein is not an individual person who gives a mental 
account of his/her own experiences. Dasein denotes the being of humans, whose mode of existence is 
distinct from that of other entities, namely to be engaged in social practices that at the same time 
constitute what they do and who they are. As such, Dasein is fundamentally social (“Dasein’s being is 
being-with” Heidegger 1962, 160); for example, one can only become a doctor in an already existing 
medical practice. 
Heidegger then defines two other ways that entities can be on the basis of how they show up for Dasein in 
the course of such practices. The first way of being he calls ready-to-hand, which means that the entity is 
encountered in fluent use as a means for a practice. A carpenter who is engaging in hammering 
encounters a hammer not as an object with properties, but as ready-to-hand equipment both for doing 
what carpenters do (hammering nails) and for being what a carpenter is (a craftsman). On the other hand, 
an entity may show up for Dasein as present-at-hand when it is encountered in a more distanced 
reflective way (for instance, as objects of curiosity, in a first encounter, when giving an account of them, 
and when attending to their construction). In this case the entity is an object of attention which makes its 
presence known through its properties rather than through its use in practices. Heidegger shows through 
a series of careful analyses of every-day phenomena that each of these ways of being has a characteristic 
structure.  
The Structure of Equipment: Holism 
The structure of equipment is a referential holism. In our everyday dealings we do not encounter 
equipment as (a collection of) objects with properties but as a means, or what Heidegger calls an in-order-
to (Heidegger 1962, 98). In use a hammer is not encountered as a wooden shank with a metal blob but as 
a ‘to-put-nails-in’; a word processor is not seen as a software artifact with a set of features but 
encountered practically as a ‘to-write-letters’, ‘to-capture-ideas’, ‘to-edit-a-memo’, depending on its place 
in different practices. Because the being of equipment is what it is for, it follows that it cannot be defined 
except in relation to a use context. First, equipment always bears for what it is on other equipment with 
which it is used. A hammer can only be understood when one is already familiar with nails and wood and 
the ways they are used in building houses from wood. Secondly, equipment is always implicated in a 
practice and draws its particular in-order-to from a chain of practical assignments, an involvement in the 
towards-which of the task at hand and the for-which of the practice (Heidegger 1962, 115). We will refer 
to this structure as the for-structure of the equipment holism. For example, the particular being of a word 
processor as equipment arises from its place in the chain of assignments in a particular practice (in-order-
to write a letter, for making a customer offer, towards securing a contract). Finally, the ultimate for-
which of this chain Heidegger terms the for-the-sake-of-which, the bearing that equipment has on 
enacting a particular identity of Dasein. In the above examples the for-the-sake-of-which might be ‘to be a 
carpenter’ or to ‘be an office clerk’. The for-the-sake-of-which is not simply a goal or purpose but an 
identity that is ultimately possible only against certain established and inherently social practices. 
These three aspects of the equipment holism - the in-order-to of equipment, its place among other 
equipment and local practices, and its ultimate connection to Dasein’s identity can be thought of as the 
parts of the equipment holism. At the same time they can be thought of as dimensions of the practice 
(Reimers et al. 2010a) since, for Heidegger, practice and equipment denote the same holism looked at 
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from different angles. The structural relationships of these parts of the holism are defined by the for-
structure. These relationships are not causal (relations between properties of things) but constitutive 
(dependencies between entities for their very constitution as such). Moreover, the references in the for-
structure are circular. Constitutive of Dasein is to have practices. Practices depend on equipment for their 
performance. Therefore, Dasein as the human way of being depends on equipment. But the being of 
equipment depends on practices and therefore on Dasein, closing the loop. This circularity of reference 
shows that equipment (and hence practice) is a holistic socio-material entity and that it has material, 
practical and social dimensions that are constitutionally entangled in the way envisioned in so-called 
sociomateriality studies (Barad 2003; Orlikowski and Scott 2008). 
The Structure of Objects: Properties 
When entities are present-at-hand as objects of attention they show up as bundles of properties. Thus 
their structure is a characteristic set of properties. The extreme case would be the independently existent 
things of the Cartesian worldview, completely defined by properties that do not depend at all on use 
context or on characteristics (activities, attitudes, intentions) of the observing subject. This contrasts 
sharply with equipment which when most genuinely in use is not present as properties at all and cannot 
be separated from its use context at all.  
Between these two extremes Heidegger defines another condition of equipment; unreadiness-to-hand (he 
never gives it the full status of a way of being). The fluent, transparent use of equipment may be 
interrupted by some form of “breakdown” (Harman 2010, 19; Winograd and Flores 1987, 36) such as 
failure of the equipment or a change in the task context. The equipment then shows itself conspicuously 
and some level of reflection is required to resolve the problem. In situations of breakdown equipment 
becomes unready-to-hand. Unreadiness-to-hand is encountered in other situations also, such as during 
learning when the user is acquiring the skill necessary for being involved with equipment in an absorbed 
way.  
Under normal circumstances objects are unready-to-hand rather that completely present-at-hand. 
Dreyfus (1991) argues that when equipment becomes conspicuous, what shows up initially are certain 
aspects of the use situation that are relative to the task and relative to our involvement in the referential 
whole, such as ‘the hammer is too heavy’ or ‘the software is too slow’. These are not properties of the tool, 
because properties are meant to be independent of a situation. If the tool is obstinate (so the situation 
cannot be repaired in a routine way) these aspects take on more of the character of properties of the tool 
itself, but only in a completely detached mode of reflection (such as scientific observation) would they 
become fully independent of human experience of the object.  
Heidegger points out that it is only through our (tacit) experience of equipment ready-to-hand in practical 
activity, and through subsequent breakdown where aspects become conspicuous, that the properties of 
objects could be intelligible to us at all: if the being of objects were completely defined by context-
independent properties, these properties could not have practical meaning for us. This is what we 
experience when we find archeological artifacts that are clearly ‘designed’, but for which we have lost the 
practical context to discern what they are for, and hence what they are (e.g. Preston 1998). Thus, on the 
basis of intelligibility (which is the basis of Heidegger’s ontology) even present-at-hand objects draw for 
their being on a background of concernful practical engagement in the world (Dasein).  
The Structure of Dasein: Being-in-the-world 
The way of being of Dasein is practical engagement in the world, which is at once what Dasein does and 
what Dasein is. These engagements of Dasein (dealings with equipment, relating to others, even 
reflecting) constitute Dasein. Heidegger denotes this as being-in-the-world to capture that Dasein is 
always involved with the entities that make up the (material and social) world and, at the same time, this 
very involvement is what makes Dasein a particular way of being, distinct from the being of other entities 
(objects and equipment). 
Heidegger shows that every involvement of Dasein with the world (each instance of being-in-the-world) 
has a common three-fold structure. First, Dasein is always already-in the world or thrown into 
involvement: Dasein is always coming from somewhere and thus brings some motivating perspective 
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(Schatzki 2010) to every engagement. The consequence is that any dealing with the entities in the world 
(equipment or objects) is given meaning by the background of existing (historical) social practices (Taylor 
2006). Second, Dasein is always already-amidst the world, meaning that Dasein is always implicated in 
the world and cannot stand outside the world and view activity from nowhere. This follows from the 
conception of Dasein as the being that actively uses the world (as equipment) rather than as an object of 
detached reflection. Thirdly, Dasein is always already-ahead, projecting into the possibilities of the world. 
This is because use of equipment by Dasein is always directed forward to a for-the-sake-of-which. Table 1 
summarizes our outline of Heidegger’s ontology. 
Table 1. Overview of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology 
Being Way of Being Structure of Being 
Dasein is the being of 
humans 
The human way of being is concernful 
engagement in practices. 
Being-in-the-world: Dasein is always 
already-in the world (past), already-
amidst the world (present), and 
already-ahead, projecting toward 
possibilities of the world (future) 
Equipment is the being of 
entities encountered by 
Dasein in use 
The way of being of equipment is to be 
ready-to-hand; withdrawn from 
experience as a means (in-order-to) 
The for-structure: Equipment is a 
referential holism with other 
equipment, practices and social 
identities  
Objects are entities that are 
encountered by Dasein 
through attention and 
breakdown 
The way of being of objects is to be 
unready-to-hand as an object of reflective 
attention, or present-at-hand as an object 
of detached analysis. 
Properties: objects are bundles of 
defining aspects/properties 
A Phenomenological Theory of Technology Appropriation  
Assume initially that a person in a trade or profession encounters a technology that s/he does not yet use 
as part of the trade or professional practice. According to Heidegger’s ontology this technology is 
encountered as present-at-hand against this practice. The implication is that the entity will be 
encountered as a bundle of properties, not as an independently existent thing of the Cartesian worldview, 
but on the basis of already having a practice-motivated perspective for the encounter (already-in the 
world), in a practical and involved way in a situation (already-amidst), and with an orientation to the 
potential use of the technology as equipment for the practice (already-toward). Even as the entity is 
inspected as an object with properties, this inspection is oriented against the background of the practice 
and its equipment, which influence what properties show up for the potential user. On the material 
dimension, bodily comportment toward the object will derive from existing skills with equipment and 
potential uses will be derived from (or in contrast to) the affordances of existing equipment. It will be 
judged as to whether it feels ‘right’ against expectations of the practice. At the same time it will be 
evaluated against a set of logics about what it could be used for compared to existing equipment expressed 
in the sayings and doings of the community of practice. Finally, it will be evaluated as to whether its use is 
appropriate against norms of the practice and whether it is consistent with the person’s occupational or 
professional identity. We should note that, as a corollary, the technology will equally not be encountered 
by the person through the properties it has for its designers or promoters. 
On the other hand, if the entity is fully accepted and becomes equipment for the person’s practice it has 
become ready-to-hand. This means that it is no longer generally an object of attention. It is used fluently 
and transparently without cognitive effort. It has a place among other equipment and uses expressed in 
the sayings and doings of that practice (Schatzki 2002). It is ‘proper’ to the practice and it reinforces the 
professional identity. As a result it withdraws into the background of the practice holism and is not 
generally a focus of attention (even though it can be). Thus, appropriation of a technology can be 
conceptualized in Heidegger’s ontology as a change in the way of being of the technology from present-at-
hand to ready-to-hand. The technology becomes a normal and a taken-for-granted part of the practice, 
familiarity with which is assumed for being an authentic member of the practice.  
But as a result of now being part of the equipment holism (the equipment for-structure), it is also part of 
the world that the person is already-in, and with which they are pressing into future possibilities. Thus, it 
is part of the holism of equipment, practices and identities that renders intelligible other encounters with 
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entities and events. Consequently, appropriation of the technology can also (and equivalently) be 
conceptualized as a move from the foreground (as something to be give meaning) to the background as a 
taken-for-granted part of what gives meaning within the practice. We can say it takes part in ‘performing’, 
as both a means of the practice and as a source of intelligibility for the practice (Barad 2007).  
Table 2. Summary of our phenomenological theory of appropriation.  
Dimension Activities that unfold over time in appropriation 
Human engagement  Inspecting  Place-making Performing 
Way of being of  
technology 
Present-at-hand Unready-to-hand Ready-to-hand 
Being of technology Object Tool Equipment 




Object properties are 
inspected using existing 
skills and expected 
affordances 
Acquiring the skill to use the 
tool. Discovering what the 
tool affords 
Equipment withdraws from 





Object is inspected against 
equipment and 
understandings of the 
existing practice 
Placing the tool among other 
tools and within the logics of 
the practice 
Equipment has a place 





Object is inspected against 
existing projects and social 
norms 
Making the tool proper in the 
practice. Placing the tool in 
social identity production 
Equipment is normal and 
part of social identity 
 
Intermediate between these two situations, the technology is an object becoming equipment, a tool 
looking for a place in the practice. Its way of being is captured in Heidegger’s ontology as unready-to-
hand. It has not yet withdrawn to the background of the practice but is no longer in the foreground as an 
object of reflection: it is in a certain middle-ground. The person’s comportment toward the technology can 
be characterized as ‘place-making’ which we see as an actively performed kind of sense-making (Vidolov 
and Kelly 2009; Weick et al. 2005). A skill for using the technology is being acquired and its affordances 
(its in-order-to) are being discovered by active embodied experimentation; its place in relation to other 
equipment (its for-which) and in the logics of the practice (its toward-which) must be similarly 
discovered. It must be placed as socially appropriate against the norms and identities of the practice (its 
for-the-sake-of-which). However, these activities are no-longer simply evaluative, nor are they primarily 
cognitive or discursive as in Weick’s notion of sense-making (Vidolov and Kelly 2009), but involve 
embodied activity that disrupts the existing equipment holism, changing socio-material practices as well 
as the being of the new and of existing technology. It is for this reason that we think the image of actively 
performed place-making is appropriate to characterize technology appropriation, as the existing practice 
and equipment holism must make room to accommodate the new technology. Table 2 summarizes our 
theory by analyzing the appropriation phenomenon along six dimensions based on the arguments 
presented above. The inclusion of practice-oriented and social dimensions indicates that the analysis 
differs markedly from familiar dualist and cognitively-oriented folk interpretations of this familiar 
phenomenon. 
A Case Study for Illustrating our Theory 
In this section we present a case study of social media appropriation at a large international consultancy 
business, which will allow us to illustrate our theory. The technology in question is Yammer, described by 
the company Yammer Inc. as “a tool for making companies and organizations more productive through 
the exchange of short frequent answers to one simple question: What are you working on?”. Yammer is 
typically described as a platform for online social networking through exchange of short messages, termed 
enterprise microblogging (Zhang et al. 2010). 
Research Methodology 
Research on technology adoption and acceptance typically has to rely on user accounts, mostly through 
interviews and surveys, either in anticipation of, or after a technology has been accepted. Having to rely 
 Riemer & Johnston / Place-making: A Phenomenological Theory of Technology Appropriation 
  
 Thirty Third International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando 2012 9 
on already interpreted accounts of the phenomenon as provided by interview subjects brings with it a 
range of typical epistemological problems that are at the center of much of the methodological discussions 
in the IS discipline. Essentially, such data does not allow researching the actual appropriation 
phenomenon as it happens at the time, but only what people think might happen when questioned 
beforehand, or their post-hoc interpretations of what happened at the time.  
Against this background, researching communicative social media, such as enterprise microblogging, 
brings with it an exciting new methodological opportunity: social media platforms capture all user 
conversations that they enable, stored as messages on the platform. This includes those messages where 
users engage in conversations about the new technology itself and their experiences of it. Hence, in 
contrast to orthodox adoption research these self-referential messages offer a unique opportunity to 
undertake a phenomenological analysis of the very activities users engage in while appropriating the new 
technology into existing practice. Rather than having to rely on time-removed, indirect accounts of the 
phenomenon provided through interviews, we are able to analyze the appropriation phenomenon as it 
unfolds. This allows more authentic access to the phenomenon and avoids the methodological and validity 
issues associated with indirect user reportage. In fact, access to such data is essential for what we want 
show, as we are precisely interested in the changes to the way of being of a new technology over time, its 
active placing into the practice, and its emerging position within the practice (background). It is for this 
reason that we use the existing user messages as our sole body of data and chose not to carry out user 
interviews.  
Our data was captured (Riemer et al. 2012) at a time when Yammer was not only new to the user group, 
but the entire idea of enterprise microblogging and social networking in the workplace was novel. This 
makes our case particularly revelatory for studying appropriation because people in our case at the time 
did not adopt a product on the background of an already well-established communication practice that 
they were familiar with from other contexts. We are thus able to study appropriation of a genuine 
technology innovation. In fact, the general practice we know today as Enterprise Microblogging emerged 
only later over time. 
Case Company 
Yammer Inc. launched its platform in September 2008. The service is organized using the concept of 
networks, with one network typically representing one company. Anyone can create a network for their 
company by registering with their email address on the platform. New users can join simply by registering 
with their corporate email address, which serves as their identifier. The focal element of the Yammer web 
frontend is a user’s personalized message stream. Like Twitter, Yammer is based on the "follower" 
principle i.e. users can choose who they follow. 
Our data comes from one of the largest Yammer company networks. Our case company is a large 
international consultancy business operating world-wide engaging in typical consultancy projects with 
and for clients. In September 2008 a small group of consultants started using Yammer. In the first few 
months, the number of users grew rather slowly. In February 2009, only about 300 Yammer accounts 
were counted in the network in total. Shortly after, the critical mass point (Markus 1987) seems to have 
been reached, with user numbers growing rapidly from March 2009 onwards with new registrations of 
more than 500 per month. Within one year the number of accounts was nearly 6,000. 
Data Sampling 
Our analysis is based on a sample drawn from the full set of messages provided to us by the company in 
Microsoft Excel format. To ensure confidentiality, all identifying information (user names and client 
names) had been removed prior to handing over the data. Yammer messages consist of metadata such as 
message ID, a reply ID, a thread ID, a user ID and the content of the message. Each message is either a 
reply to another message that inherits the thread ID of this original message, or it is a new message 
commencing a thread with a new ID. Thus thread IDs can be used to capture conversations consisting of 
multiple messages. For our study we are only interested in conversations concerned with Yammer itself, 
posts that in one way or another are self-referential in their concern with Yammer and its appropriation. 
Hence, a sample was drawn using a set of keywords (e.g. as yam, Yammer, yamming, reyam and so forth) 
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identified from a preliminary analysis of a subset of the data and validated by sample testing (Riemer et 
al. 2012). The sample includes all messages of all threads where any message contains at least one of the 
keywords as a single word, a word stem or, part of another word. Filtering at the thread level preserves 
communication context and coherence; the resulting threads were then ordered by time for coding and 
content analysis.  
Our sample had been derived as part of an earlier study we undertook prior to developing our theory, 
which focused quite narrowly on the types of messages users exchange during technology appropriation. 
In the following we will draw on some of the analyses undertaken for this previous study (Riemer et al. 
2012), but also carry out further analyses of the sample data specifically concerned with illustrating our 
theory. For the earlier study a design decision was made to analyze Yammer self-referential messages 
covering the period from the creation of the network until two months after the tipping point was reached 
(September 2008 to May 2009). This period is appropriate for our purposes as it captures the crucial 
months in which members of the company actively engage in accepting Yammer into company practice 
(see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Number of all messages and self-referential messages per month over time 
Data Analysis 
Coding and analysis of Yammer messages was carried out with the aim to learn about the kinds of 
messages people send as part of technology appropriation. Accordingly, each message was coded 
regarding the purpose it serves as part of appropriation. Much like in communication genre analysis, such 
codes are not imposed top down but identified from the ground up through the qualitative analysis of the 
“…socially recognized communicative purpose” (Yates et al. 1999, 84) of each single message interpreted 
against the background of the overall case. From this analysis, patterns in the form of conversation types 
emerged. Determining conversation types was constantly recursive and reflexive with an aim of being 
“…systematic and analytical but not too rigid” (Altheide 1996, 16). The data was coded by one researcher 
with a second researcher acting as a discussant and analyst in a confirmatory role. Iterative recoding 
continued until both researchers agreed on the outcome. In total, 5,411 messages were analyzed. 1,706 
messages were included in the analysis as being concerned with appropriation, with 2,079 codes assigned 
(some messages serve more than one purpose). Five message categories emerged from this analysis (see 
table 3). The distribution of these categories over time is plotted in Figure 2 to show quantitative changes 
in appropriation-related user communication. Please note that we treat the timeframe from September to 
December 2008 as one period, as there were very few messages, distorting proportional presentation. 
The second step in our analysis was to code the data at the thread level. We analyzed all threads in which 
discussions among a group of users unfolded, excluding all single messages and simple two-message 
question and answer exchanges. This step complements the analysis at the message level as we are able to 
capture the social nature of appropriation-related communication. First, we noted in a table the main 
topic(s) covered in each thread; second, we determined the nature of the conversation in relation to our 
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theory (as inspecting, place-making, performing); third, we coded the thread in relation to the dimension 
of our theory framework (material, practical, social); and finally, we interpreted each thread to locate 
Yammer within the conversation (foreground/background). 
Table 3. Message categories emerging from coding at the message level 
Message type Description Example 
Functionality Users ask questions about Yammer features 
in positive, negative or informing ways, while 
other users respond to assist. 
“how can I let Yammer make a sound whenever 
someone does a post?” (28/09/08) 
Comparison Users compare Yammer to other 
technologies they are already familiar with 
(positive or negative or merely informative) 
or ask questions regarding comparison of 
Yammer.  
“So this is like a cross between Chatterous and 
Twitter with a couple of extra 'corporate' features 
- like the org chart. I think Laconica looks more 
interesting...” (10/09/08) 
Use Users envision, share, discuss and scrutinize 
ways of using Yammer and the emerging 
benefits and risks they see. 
“Think of Yammer as a way of chatting with your 
colleagues when hanging around the coffee 
machine - even though you may be working at a 
client location or from home” (13/02/09) 
Norming Users engage in discussions about 
appropriate language, which content to post 
in Yammer or how to use it more generally; 
they also observe ‘non-compliant’ behavior. 
“Welcome all new Yamsters (or whatever we're 
supposed to call ourselves!) (...) As we've had 
many new joiners recently, … it seems a good 
time to mention the one Golden Rule: (…) please 
do not publish anything here that is strictly 
company confidential.” (23/02/09) 
Diffusion Users discuss ways to initiate, manage or 
support Yammer diffusion to get more users 
on board, or ask for assistance in promoting 
Yammer within the company. 
“i am just composing newsletter (...) about joining 
Yammer (...) so let's see maybe we will see more 
german folks here yamming:-) (10/04/09) 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of self-referential message types over time 
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Findings 
Drawing on the data from the two steps of our analysis, in this section we present our findings. Our 
analysis of the technology appropriation phenomenon in a real case, using first-hand data, will allow us to 
illustrate our theory and expose the structure of the technology appropriation phenomenon. We will use 
the changes in the nature and frequency of appropriation-related messages and conversions as evidence of 
changes in the nature of the technology against the practice and changes of its place in the practice. In 
doing so, we will demonstrate how appropriation of Yammer in the case company unfolded, evidenced by 
how user conversations change over time displaying the activities outlined in table 2. Finally, we will show 
how Yammer moves from being an object requiring reflection against the background of existing 
practices, to become a taken-for-granted part of an emerging practice in the background, lending meaning 
to other aspects in the practice foreground as they are present in conversations in our data sample. 
Encountering: Inspecting Yammer against existing Skill, Practice and Tools 
When the new technology is first encountered by the group of early adopters it is evident from our data 
that it is being inspected and judged as an object against existing practice. Almost 80% of all messages in 
the first few months and at least half of all messages until February 2009 are classified as functionality or 
comparison (see figure 1). Within the threads people scrutinize the features of the new object (“Looks like 
there's no opportunity (yet) to link with 3rd party feeds” 11/09/08) and compare it with other tools that 
they already use and know (“internal twitter eh?” 18/09/08). Consistent with our theory, in these 
statements Yammer is clearly the object of interest in the foreground encountered through its features 
about which statements are being made in comparison to what is already used and known (“always 
wondered the added value of a business twitter. the low activity here tends to prove that the value is 
low...” 01/12/09). 
Place-making: Actively Making Room for Yammer within the Practice  
In February 2009 we find evidence of people increasingly using Yammer (see number of all posts in figure 
1) and beginning to actively place the new tool within their practice. This is reflected in the distribution of 
message categories: self-referential messages peak in March (figure 1), “use” takes over as the largest 
message category (figure 2), capturing instances where people exchange ideas for using Yammer and 
share their experiences. We find further evidence in the discussion threads for place-making along all 
three dimensions of our theory (see table 2): 
Firstly, we find evidence that people actively engage in learning, as they ask for help or share useful tips 
once they figure out how to work the new tool (”Anyone know how to update a group description? (…) I 
can't see where to change this” 10/03/09). Moreover, they share emerging affordances as they put the 
tool to use (“you can (if you wish) set group to 'private' - which might be worthwhile for a project.” 
06/03/09).  
Secondly, people further engage in place-making as they incorporate Yammer within the ‘toolbox’ and 
logics of the practice. In doing so, Yammer is no longer just judged against the background of what is 
already known, but is placed side-by-side existing tools in order to discuss their respective emerging roles. 
We first find evidence for this in the middle of February 2009: “Office Communicator is a fundamentally 
different concept to Yammer. GIMS is IM, not "microblog" – it’s audience, range and purpose are 
different.” 12/02/09). Subsequently, a large number of conversations emerges that engage in placing 
Yammer in the logics of the company practices (“Yammer has already proved itself a great way of 
establishing new contacts. (…) If I need a more real-time conversation with my new-found contact, I can 
do so via telephone or IM. If I need to swap sensitive information - or just have a lot to say 
asynchronously, I can use email.” 08/03/09), envisioning how it might link up with the purpose of the 
consulting practice and the benefits it might yield: “Some thoughts on how to put yammer to good use in 
a business: [Link to online blog post removed]” (14/03/09). Furthermore, we find evidence that enrolling 
Yammer into company practice is not just finding, but actively making a place for it, in the course of 
which other tools change their roles as well. For example, in a conversation in April 2009 it becomes 
obvious that the company wiki takes up the new role of capturing worthwhile themes emerging in 
Yammer conversations, while in a conversation in May people discuss ways in which email changes with 
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the arrival of Yammer in the practice (“I propose discontinuing email list, and use yammer groups 
instead. People will get less email pushed to them, and will be able to join any conversation they like. 
Less emailing, more yamming?” 05/05/09). 
Thirdly, we find evidence of place-making in the social dimension with people negotiating norms and 
rules for ‘proper’ tool use and making Yammer ‘their own’. The distribution of message categories shows a 
strong peak in norming-related communications in March and April (see figure 2). In March a group of 
users begins to jointly create a set of normative rules in the form of a “Code of conduct”, which takes place 
in a wiki with Yammer capturing the accompanying discussions. This norming communication is an 
essential part of place-making as it establishes a joint understanding of “what one does” within the 
emerging Yammer practice (“Should we have a list of things people should do e.g. you should engage, 
you should ask the group for help, you should talk about your role in [the company], you should be 
constructive in any criticism etc. something akin to the rules of a barcamp” 11/03/09). Similarly, users 
increasingly engage in diffusion-related communication as they try to get others to join the emerging 
practice and exchange ideas for how to promote Yammer within their local groups (figure 2). Actively 
promoting Yammer contributes to placing the new tool within the wider company practice and is evidence 
that users begin to consider Yammer as being “for us”. Moreover, we find evidence that people engage in 
inventing new language for talking about Yammer, e.g. coining the term “Yamming” which subsequently 
appears on a frequent basis when referring to the emerging practice of Yammer use. This is equally 
evidence of taking ownership of the new tool. Furthermore, we find increasing evidence that Yammer is 
being officially welcomed within the company, contributing to a sense of social appropriateness: “I get the 
feeling from my team's better take up rate for Yammer rather than Twitter that the "official sanction" of 
a [company] specific tool means they are more comfortable in using this at work.” (04/03/09) Finally, 
we find many short conversations in which users help newly joined members to get acquainted with 
Yammer. Such a form of apprenticeship is further evidence of people taking ownership and making 
Yammer part of the social fabric of the company. 
Performing Meaning: Intelligibility on the Background of Yamming Practice  
As Yammer is taken up in everyday use and finds its place in the company practice, it begins to withdraw 
from discourse as an object. Evidence for this is provided in figure 1, where messages in the comparison 
category almost vanish at the end of the study period, while in total messages that treat Yammer as an 
object (functionality and comparison) drop to around 20%. At the same time, a closer look at messages in 
the functionality category reveals that in later months these messages are mainly concerned with assisting 
newly joining users in getting acquainted with Yammer, but only rarely contain the kinds of judgments 
found at the beginning of the study period. 
More important for our argument is that Yammer starts showing up in the background of conversation 
threads, where the newly emerging Yamming practice lends intelligibility to the issues being discussed in 
the foreground. At the beginning of April we find first evidence of such conversations. For example, when 
people discuss if one should limit message length to 140 characters an existing Yamming practice is 
already implied in the discussion (“Why can't people just be allowed to express themselves as they wish? 
I agree that brevity should be encouraged, but not that it should be imposed.” 03/04/09). Similarly, a 
discussion of how to have Yammer messages appear in Twitter is made on the background of existing 
Yamming practice (Q: “H2 tweet from yammer?” A: “You can't tweet from Yammer but you can yam 
from Twitter.” 03/04/09). Further examples include a sense-making discussion of what to do when 
Yammer users leave the company (22/05/09), and a discussion about whether Yammer participation 
should be rewarded in company performance indicators (KPI). In all of these conversations Yammer is 
not the subject of conversation. Rather, the conversations take place on the basis of a now assumed 
familiarity with Yamming practice. Even the evaluation of Yammer features increasingly draws on 
Yamming practice, e.g. in cases where new Yammer features are launched: “The [Yammer notification] 
email no longer lets you check out the person's Yammer profile - you get "follow"... and that's it. I don't 
like that.” (06/04/09) 
Finally, we find evidence for Yammer being in the foreground of some messages all the way through our 
data set, since new users join the emerging practice all the time. However, those people who join Yammer 
later do not encounter an object in the same way as the early adopters. Rather they encounter a tool in 
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use, as traces of Yamming practice are already visible on Yammer: “Just joined Yammer. Quite exciting 
stuff going around here!” (21/04/09) 
Performing the Practice: Yammer finds its Place in Performing the Practice 
As Yammer finds its place in the practice users reflect on what Yammer has become, e.g. a means to share 
“things I find (…) to bring to the attention of the community” (27/04/09), and a means to ”share my 
findings on activities in different places in the group [and] on different topics with my colleagues (…) 
[and for] for gaining access to unstructured updates” 16/04/09).  
People further discuss what it is for, the role it assumes within the practice (“Yammer is enabling you to 
know people from the whole globe based on their inputs often with even true cutting-edge ideas. You 
would have never been able to experience it, by just picking people from formal org structure” 
20/04/09, and: Yammer “help[s] me achieve a number of things: create awareness of the initiative, 
establish greater communication, maintain momentum, gather ideas, share knowledge, ask questions, 
etc.” 27/04/09). As Yammer assumes these roles users express that Yamming practice is now an essential 
part of the company practice and its logics (“Yes, it is all about sharing and inspiring! This is how we 
truly will differentiate us from the small local players and beat the other majors” 16/04/09). 
Finally, we find evidence that Yamming practice is now becoming a normal part of the daily life of 
consultants in the company (“Conversations and interactions on Yammer are becoming essential and 
frequently used tool for many of us during work hours” 24/04/09, in an online Blog post) and part of 
their professional identities as consultants (“I cannot imagine any working day without being logged 
into Yammer” 19/04/09). Moreover, it shines through in a number of discussions that users are heavily 
invested in their shared Yamming practice, which hints at a sense of ownership and “ourness”, such as in 
this response to the idea of incentivizing Yammer participation in the KPIs: “Yammer works because 
there is no KPI and because people have choosen to adopt the solution (bottom up) instead of a top down 
push” (05/05/09). 
In summary, it is evident from our data that Yammer becomes an integral part of the practice for-
structure as users share explicit stories about what Yammer has become (its in-order-to), how it performs 
its role (its for-which) as part of fulfilling the practice (towards-which) and how it has become a normal 
part of being a member of the practice (for-the-sake-of-which). Overall, our analysis has shown that the 
appropriation phenomenon evident in the user conversations in our case corresponds with our theory.  
Discussion: Place-making as a Second Order Practice 
On the basis of our theory and the case illustration we can describe what happens when a technology is 
appropriated into a practice. The technology is first encountered as an object against an existing practice 
background. When appropriated it becomes equipment for the practice. This means that the technology 
finds a place in the equipment/practice holism and as such becomes implicated in how the practice makes 
further happenings intelligible. Equivalently, the technology through appropriation moves from the 
foreground (as something to be made intelligible) to the background (as a basis of intelligibility). 
We have demonstrated that technology appropriation (the becoming of equipment) happens by way of 
what we have termed actively performed place-making. We have shown that appropriation as place-
making is not a series of discrete decisions but extends over time as it disrupts an existing practice by way 
of active experimentation, conversation and negotiation. However, we do not want to characterize the 
“moves” from foreground to background as a process for two reasons. First, there is no clear-cut 
beginning to it. Practitioners will typically have some level of familiarity with this or similar technology 
prior to physical encounter and this contributes already to placing. Second, the becoming of equipment 
does not have any end point. It continues to influence further change through altered meanings that it 
provides as part of the new background. Additionally there is no traditional causal process chain 
expressed in our theory. Rather what changes is a set of mutually dependent constitutive relations that 
make up the equipment holism. The circle of mutually co-constituting parts of the for-structure is altered 
to accommodate the new equipment. 
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A causal description of the usual human-centered kind is challenged in this account in other ways. Place-
making is a collective activity, which means the individual human is not the sole causal agent in this 
appropriation story. According to Heidegger’s ontology, appropriation always has to be a social act 
because the for-the-sake-of-which of equipment is necessarily a social identity. Thus, it is always a 
practice that meets a technology through the individual agent. Consequently, our theory can equally be 
applied to individuals accepting technologies against general life-practices as well as professional 
communities appropriating a technology for specific professional practices. Finally, we have shown that, 
as well as being inherently social, appropriation also draws on material agency (Pickering 1995) because 
place-making depends on the material technology as much as on the social projects of the practice, which 
is to say that the equipment holism is inherently socio-material (as expressed in the equipment for-
structure). Table 4 characterizes place-making compared to cognitivist/decision-oriented conceptions of 
change. 
Table 4. Characteristics of technology appropriation as place-making 
Characteristics Technology appropriation is not… Rather, it is… 
Active … (simply) a cognitive interpretation of 
the technology 
… actively making the technology a practical means for 
the practice 
Practical … (simply) learning how to use the 
technology 
… practical experimentation and adjustments to find 
uses 
Social … an individual decision … (implicitly or explicitly) a collective accomplishment 
Becoming … a one time or repeated decision to use … extended in time because it involves disruption to 
practices 
Ongoing … a process with a definite start or end 
point 
… it is a continuous becoming as the practice evolves 
over time 
Holistic … (simply) a reconfiguration of an 
individual technology 
… a reconfiguration of the equipment (practice) holism 
Identity 
producing 
… (simply) making rules for its use … finding its implication for a social identity or way of 
life 
We conclude that while place-making might appear as a process with stages to an observer outside the 
practice (e.g. encounter, placing, performing), from within the practice (as captured by our data) place-
making is best interpreted as a practice. This interpretation is consistent with our own theoretical tools. 
Our analysis of the case data showed that placing Yammer within the focal consulting practice occurs 
within the three dimensions outlined in table 2. However, the activities of place-making itself can also be 
seen to occur on these same three dimensions:  
1. Place-making has its own material dimension: It involves actions (not just cognition), both 
manipulative and conversational as evidenced by the very existence of our data sample. Moreover, 
place-making involves embodied engagement and experimentation with the new tool, through which 
new skills are acquired and affordances emerge contextually. 
2. Place-making has its own practical dimension: Place-making draws on its own equipment. In our case 
this occurs through the use of Yammer (in a self referential way) together with wikis and online blogs. 
Moreover, the place-making practice has its own logics, activities and stories. People engage in 
actively finding appropriate roles for the technology, the sharing of use stories, negotiating proper use 
(in the form of codes of conduct), observing emerging norms, activities of apprenticeship and 
assisting others, as well as actively promoting the new technology into the wider consulting practice. 
3. Place-making has its own social dimension: There is a sense of involvement and identity with the 
enterprise of place-making, evidenced in the “movement” character by which members of the practice 
(the early adopters) associate themselves explicitly with the place-making practice as they take the 
initiative in actively promoting the new technology and enrolling further members into Yamming 
practice. 
Thus, we conclude that place-making has the characteristic of a practice also. It is a practice concerned 
with changing another practice, which has been termed a second order practice (Reimers et al. 2010b). 
Characterizing place-making as a practice also helps us to articulate practical implications of our theory. 
First, like all organizational practices, place-making can be cultivated. Organizations that have well 
developed generic technology placing practices will be better able to leverage emerging ICT technologies 
Social and Organizational Impacts of IS 
16 Thirty Third International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando 2012  
to allow them to innovate and differentiate. Thus place-making qualifies as a strategic Dynamic Capability 
(Teece et al. 1997). Second, the dimensions we have used to describe the equipment holism suggest 
possible points of leverage, or roles, for facilitating an organizational place-making practice: 1) On the 
material dimension management can take the form of coaching or mentoring whereby users are assisted 
in developing skills and discovering emerging affordances through apprenticeship; 2) On the practical 
dimension management can take the form of promoting and facilitating by way of sharing stories about 
‘use cases’ that emerge from within the practice to help others in placing the new technology; 3) On the 
social dimension management can take the form of policy-making for deriving and promoting proper 
technology use, and ambassadorship where management legitimizes and actively promotes the 
technology. Hence, an appropriate metaphor (Morgan 1986) for managing place-making is “lubricating”, 
whereby users are assisted in “slotting into place” new technologies within existing practice. These ideas 
will have to be further explored in future research. 
Conclusion 
We use Heidegger’s notion of equipment and ways of being to formulate a phenomenological theory of 
technology appropriation, which we apply to and illustrate with a unique data set from an empirical case 
of appropriation of a social media technology into a consulting practice. We demonstrate that when 
technologies are appropriated into practice they change their way of being from a present-at-hand object 
encountered as a bundle of features to a ready-to-hand means for the enterprise of the practice, captured 
in the Heidegger’s holistic notion of equipment. Equivalently, the technology moves from being in the 
foreground as an object inspected against an existing practice background, to being implicated in the 
background where it takes part in making intelligible other entities and events in the foreground. We have 
characterized the way in which this transformation happens as a second order practice of actively 
performed place-making. 
We contribute to the IS literature a new theory of appropriation. Our theory does not aim to expose a 
causal structure for explaining or predicting how appropriation leads to certain outcomes. Rather, it 
exposes the structures by which transformations happen at the ontological level. Thus it is a theory for 
explaining (Gregor 2006) how relationships of mutual constitution between entities change over time 
when new technology is accommodated into an existing practice holism through the sociomaterial 
practice of place-making. We further contribute to the literature by providing a detailed empirical case on 
appropriation as a rich illustration of the practice of place-making.  
Against existing literature, our study contributes by exposing the time-extended and active nature of 
appropriation, which demonstrates that putting technology to use cannot be modeled as simple decisions 
of technology acceptance (cf. Davis and Bagozzi 1989; Venkatesh et al. 2003). We further clarify existing 
ideas about how technology changes ontologically in appropriation (cf. Carroll et al. 2002; Orlikowski 
2000). In doing so, the holistic notion of practice, grounded in Heidegger’s ontology, offers a way to 
capture change resulting from appropriation without the need to locate changes in the properties of one 
or other of the technology or the user entity (cf. DeSanctis and Poole 1994; Mendoza et al. 2010). 
Moreover, we demonstrate that the changes to practice are neither simply cognitive or discursive (cf. 
Weick et al. 2005), nor are they the sole result of human agency. Rather, place-making is always practical, 
socio-material and performative (Barad 2007), and as such contributes to a post-humanist understanding 
of agency (Introna 2007; Latour 2005; Pickering 1995). Given that Heidegger’s work and the emerging 
stream of sociomateriality research (Leonardi and Barley 2010; Orlikowski 2010) share similar 
ontological commitments, our work represents a detailed worked example of a non-dualist and socio-
material approach to the study of technology.   
We further contribute to IS practice by exposing the workings of a place-making practice with a rich case 
study. As such, our theory and case illustration provide the basis for identifying effective points of 
leverage for facilitating place-making of new technologies into organizational practice. Further research is 
needed to derive more detailed guidance for managers who want to facilitate place-making practice. In the 
context of enterprise social media, our study contributes to unraveling the phenomenon of social media 
emergence, previously described as the self-organizing way in which social media appear in organizations 
(McAfee 2009), which has been treated as a somewhat mystical black-box so far. Our case study offers 
rich insight into this phenomenon by characterizing it as the result of successful place-making practices. 
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Our study is novel in various ways. First, we use Heidegger’s for-structure of equipment and the three-fold 
structure of Dasein in an analytical way in an empirical study, which demonstrates the usefulness of his 
work in guiding research in the IS field. Second, we demonstrate the advantages of using the content of 
social media as on innovative methodology for studying its own appropriation. Finally, as a quasi by-
product of our study we offer a novel account of how practices change.  
Our research is bounded by the particular nature of our data set. First, we can only draw on conversations 
and place-making activities visible in the Yammer data set. Second, the data set does not allow accessing 
the phenomenon of readiness-to-hand, where equipment functions as a transparent means in the 
everyday dealings of the members of the practice. Having characterized technology appropriation in this 
way, future studies might complement such data with observational enquiries. 
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